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Abstract 
 
KATHLEEN FOODY: Contesting the Jurists’ Authority:  
Muslim Critique and Counter­Traditions in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(Under the direction of Professors Carl Ernst, Katherine P. Ewing, and Omid Safi) 
 
 In this thesis I suggest that attending to the rhetorical construction of Iranian dissident 
arguments allows entry to a complex world of continually reconstructed and resituated  
Iranian imaginaries of Islam. Here, I engage with the work of two contemporary dissident 
Iranian authors, Abdolkarim Soroush (b. 1945 CE) and Mohammad Mujtahid Shabestari (b.  
1936), and demonstrate the ways in which their critiques of Islamic juridical authority and 
Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) themselves draw upon long­standing debates within Islamic 
tradition.  I argue that, while these authors do in fact reimagine and reform elements of 
Islamic tradition in order to argue for a rationalist democratic politics, that reformation 
cannot be understood merely as the imposition of Euro­American models of secularism, but 
rather prioritizes a refigured imaginary of Islamic worship linked to inner states and self­
conscious embodied practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv  
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………...1 
 
I.  Orthodoxy and Discursive Traditions: Who Speaks for Real Islam?...................................3 
 
     Legal Constructions and Legitimate Authority……………………………………………3 
     Authenticity and Secular Critique…………………………………………………………4 
II. Abdolkarim Soroush and Spiritual (Batini) Religiosity………………………………….10 
 
     Semantic Slips: Valayat and Velayat……………………………………………………..15 
 
     Spiritual (Batini) Religiosity and Secularist Hermeneutics……………………………...21 
 
III. Mohammad Mojtahid Shabestari and the Practice of Adab…………………...................25 
 
      Constructing the State and Enforcing Moral Order……………………………………...26 
 
      Jurisprudence as a Worldly Science: The Decline of Islamic Jurisprudence……………36 
 
      Tensions in Embodied Ethics and Democratic Citizenship……………………………...40 
 
Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………………..46 
 
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Introduction 
 Iranian Muslim reformists, such as Abdolkarim Soroush, Muhammad Shabestari, and 
Mohsen Kadivar, gained international attention during the Iranian Reform Movement of the 
1990s.  As the state loosened censorship of the press, Iranian religious intellectuals 
(roshanfekran­e dini) made political platforms out of journals and newspapers, critiquing the 
Islamic Republic through veiled discussions of religious knowledge and pluralist 
hermeneutics.
1
  Scholars of Islam and Iran (and even some broader politically­minded 
analysts) latched on to these dissident pluralistic readings of religious knowledge.  They read 
these Muslim reformists as not only the delayed expression of Iranian civil society, but as 
bringing modernist Euro­American philosophical concerns into Muslim Iranian politics.
2
  
However, they have largely ignored the ways these dissident secularist discourses, largely 
opposed to the intertwining of the government apparatus with the Islamic legal (fiqhi) 
establishment, also draw upon indigenous traditions within Iranian Islam.    
 In this thesis I suggest that attending to the rhetorical construction of these dissident 
arguments, arguments based in deeply embedded theological debates, moves us beyond the 
hegemonic secular and instead to a much more complex world of continually reconstructed 
and resituated  Iranian imaginaries of Islam. Here, I engage with the work of two 
contemporary dissident Iranian authors, Abdolkarim Soroush (b. 1945 CE) and Mohammad 
                                                 
 
1
 Forough Jahanbakhsh, “Religious and Political Discourse in Iran: Moving Toward Post­
Fundamentalism,” Brown Journal of World Affairs v9, 2 (2003): 247; Adam Torock, “The Muzzling of the 
Liberal Press in Iran,” Third World Quarterly 22, no. 4 (2001): 588­9. 
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  See Said Amir Arjomand, “The Reform Movement and the Debate over Modernity and Tradition in 
Contemporary Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 34 (2002): 719­731.  
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Mujtahid Shabestari (b. 1936), and demonstrate the ways in which their critiques of Islamic 
juridical authority and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) themselves draw upon long­standing 
debates within Islamic tradition.  I argue that, while these authors do in fact reimagine and 
reform elements of Islamic tradition in order to argue for a rationalist democratic politics, 
that reformation cannot be understood merely as the imposition of Euro­American models of 
secularism, but rather prioritizes a refigured imaginary of Islamic worship linked to inner 
states and self­conscious embodied practice.  First, I outline the innovative formation of the 
Islamic Republic and the model of juridical authority that it institutionalizes.  Second, I note 
the ways in which some contemporary theories of secularism and the secular posit critical 
reformist Muslim philosophies as outside the bounds of Islamic discursive traditions; these 
boundaries are drawn, I suggest in this paper, based upon a limited view of Islamic tradition 
that denies not only the ways in which Muslims have constantly contested and reformed 
Islamic orthodoxy, but also the multiple and often contradictory modalities of Islamic 
traditions.  Third, I outline the arguments of first Soroush and then Shabestari, highlighting 
the registers within Islamic tradition that they draw upon in their critique of Islamic 
jurisprudence.  In both these cases, I argue that these dissident Iranian formulations require 
us to nuance received theories of the secular and secularism and to attend more closely to the 
ways in which Islamic imaginaries are themselves embedded in twenty-first century Muslim 
secularisms.    
  
 
 
I.  Orthodoxy and Discursive Traditions: Who Speaks for Real Islam?  
Legal Constructions and Legitimate Authority: The Guardianship of the Jurist  
 The Islamic Republic, as institutionalized in both the original 1979 constitution and 
the revised 1989 constitution, represents a state in which the authority of Muslim jurists 
(fuqaha’) is given highest priority.
3
  The political structure of the Islamic Republic 
institutionalizes this formation.  Article five of the constitution, for example, states that the 
leadership of Muslims is the responsibility of the “just and pious” legal scholar (faqih).
4
  At 
the Islamic Republic’s base is a “bifurcation of executive power” between the a popularly 
elected president and parliament, on the one hand, and this supreme legal scholar, selected by 
a body of other highly ranked legal scholars, on the other.  While the president serves a four 
year term (with a limit of two terms in office), the Faqih is appointed for life, oversees the 
armed forces, and has the authority to veto the president’s decisions.
5
  This focus on Islamic 
juridical authority, is based largely upon Ruhollah Khomeini’s theory of the guardianship of 
the jurist (velayat­e faqih).  In the period leading up to the 1979 Iranian Revolution and 
during the constitutional debates that followed, Khomeini argued that the proper government 
                                                 
3
 Bahman Bakhtiari and Haleh Vaziri, “Iran’s Liberal Revolution?” Current History 101, n.651 (2002), 
17­18; For a discussion of the ways in which Iranian political actors debated Khomeini’s own contradictory 
populist and authoritarian statements following his death, see Daniel Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini: The 
Struggle for Reform in Iran (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001); Also see articles 107 through 
132 of the Iranian constitution, http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran­info/Government/constitution.html 
(accessed December 8, 2008). 
 
 
4
 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran <http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran­
info/Government/constitution­1.html>, accessed January 14, 2008.  
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 Bakhtiari and Vaziri; For a detailed discussion of the complexities of power sharing and institutional 
divides within the Islamic Republic, see Brumberg.  
 
4  
for a Muslim society is one in which experts in religious law oversee the state.  Khomeini 
suggested that “since the enactment of … [shari`a]…is necessary,…the formation of a 
government and the establishment of executive and administrative organs are also 
necessary.”
6
  In order for Islamic ordinances to be enacted, for Islamic law to play its 
appropriate role in Muslim life, a government was needed.  Khomeini offered a particularly 
political reading of the jurist’s responsibilities.  According to Khomeini, “Since Islamic 
government is a government of law, knowledge of the law is necessary for the ruler,” 
especially in the absence of the twelfth imam.
7
  During the occultation, in other words, only a 
jurist would have adequate knowledge to rule.   In re­imagining the construction of the 
jurists’ guardianship, Khomeini differed drastically from earlier scholars (a fact I’ll return to 
shortly), yet regardless of the degree of innovation, Khomeini’s articulation greatly 
influenced the formation of the Islamic Republic.  These theories of velayat­e faqih therefore 
define much of the contexts in which dissident authors have voiced their arguments since the 
early 1980s.
8
     
Authenticity and Secular Critique 
 Whereas Khomeini, and the institution of the Islamic Republic as a whole, promoted 
the authority of the jurists as the representatives of the Hidden Imam and linked that 
representation to political governmental power, Soroush and Shabestari (alongside other 
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 Ruhollah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: The Selected Works of Imam Khomeini, ed. Hamid Algar 
(Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1981), 42.  
 
 
7
 Ibid., 59; For a discussion of Khomeini’s specifically legal arguments for this position, see also 
Robert Gleave, “Political Aspects of Modern Shi`i Legal Discussions: Khumayni and Khu’i on ijtihad and 
qada’,” in Shaping the Current Islamic Reformation, edited by B.A. Roberson (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 
2003): 96­116. 
 
 
8
 For a discussion of the legal transformation that took place between the 1979 and 1989 constitutions, 
as well as the ways in which the Islamic Republic incorporates an innovative vision of Islamic law, see Asghar 
Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1997). 
  
5  
dissident Iranian religious intellectuals) moved to delegitimize not only the jurist’s 
governmental position, but to deprioritize the place of legalist readings of Islam more 
broadly.  I will explore these dissident arguments in a moment.  First, I simply note that these 
articulations of secularist politics and, significantly, the critiques of Islamic legalism through 
which they are voiced, have been read as outside the confines of Islamic religious reason.  
Indeed, this is a position Saba Mahmood took in a 2005 article entitled “Secularism, 
Hermeneutics, and Empire.”  Mahmood’s essay is insightful, particularly in its identification 
of the United States’ theologically based international agenda, but it highlights the problem 
of defining the “discursive traditions” central to Asadian projects.
9
  Mahmood’s essay 
focuses on the United States’ billion dollar project of refashioning Islam internationally.  
According to Mahmood, the United States government draws on the (common) conception of 
secularism that links state neutrality toward religion with freedom of conscience.
10
  Yet 
Mahmood suggests that calls to reinforce secular divisions misunderstand the nature of 
secularism itself.  Secularism is not a neutral project, but rather one that demands the 
construction of a certain kind of subjectivity.  In other words, Mahmood (similarly to Asad 
and drawing on his work explicitly) contests secularism’s neutrality.  Not only does 
secularism form certain types of subjects, but the avowedly secularist and secularizing 
agenda of the United State’s project (embodied in the “World Muslim Outreach” program 
with 1.3 billion dollars) hosts an “overt theological agenda.” Rather than targeting Muslim 
individuals who support militarization or violence, both the United States and the Rand 
Corporation designate “traditionalist” Muslims, who enact non­liberal understandings of 
                                                 
 
9
 For Talal Asad’s most recent definition of discursive traditions see: “Reading a Modern Classic: 
W.C. Smith’s ‘The Meaning and End of Religion,’” History of Religions 40, no. 3 (2001): 205­222. 
 
 
10
 Saba Mahmood, “Secularism, Hermeneutics, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation,” 
Public Culture 18, no.2 (2006): 324. 
6  
religion and subjectivity but are generally not engaged in or supportive of violence,  as the 
greatest threat to US interests abroad.   The basis for this threat is a religious hermeneutics 
that, according to the Rand Corporation, runs counter to “a modern democratic mind­set: 
critical thinking, creative problem solving, individual liberty, secularism.”  U.S. programs are 
concerned less with militancy and more with the “interpretative act” indicative of liberal 
citizens.
 11
  The U.S. therefore attempts to enact an Islamic reformation that would remake a 
traditionalist hermeneutic into one compatible with the demands of secular democracy. 
 This question of hermeneutics is central to Mahmood’s critique and to her 
interrogation of liberal Muslim intellectuals.  Here, I suggest that Mahmood reads the 
Muslim reformists she interrogates as outside the traditions of Islam.  She argues that in 
liberal Muslim hermeneutics “the notion of the transcendent, no longer locatable within the 
religious text, finds a place in the ineffable and privatized world of individual readers who 
turn not to traditional authority but to their own cultured sensibilities to experience the true 
meaning of the word.”
12
  The “traditional authority” cited by Mahmood, the identification 
with which marks a non­secularized, non­imperializing Muslim, seems to be the Islamic 
apparatus of specifically juridical authority.  Indeed, it is this authority that the Rand 
Corporation identifies as problematic and in need of modernist reformation.  According to 
Mahmood, the Rand report denounces “traditionalist” Muslims for “their inability to 
denounce the juristic tradition for its deficient and contradictory character.”
13
  While 
Mahmood’s analysis does actually capture certain elements of reformist approaches to the 
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7  
Qur’an, her further identification, on the one hand, of “ineffable” experience as a secularist­
imperialist imposition and, on the other, of juridical authority specifically as the central 
aspect of traditional Muslim practice, denies the depth of Muslim relation to both inner 
experience (and not simply practice) and of alternative structures of non­juridical (fiqhi) 
authority in Islamic history.  Mahmood sees this turning away from “traditional” authority as 
only linked to the imposition of a hegemonic secular; an imposition so drastic that it places 
these authors outside of Islamic logics and as the “ally” of Western imperialism.
14
  The 
problematic here, which I would like to contest, is Mahmood’s implicit assertion that only 
two options exist for contemporary Muslims: pre­defined Islamic logics or secular­
imperialist ones.    
 Mahmood is not the only scholar of Islam to suggest this bifurcation.  Instead, this 
discussion of Western imperialism and secularist Muslims highlights an ongoing tension in 
constructions both of Islam as a discursive tradition and the assumed orthodoxy at the center 
of that tradition.  Ovamir Anjum, in his essay “Islam as a Discursive Tradition: Talal Asad 
and His Interlocutors,” similarly positions liberal Muslims as mouthpieces for (non­Muslim) 
Euro­American projects.  He agrees with Charles Hirschkind’s reading that the liberal 
Muslim reformer Nasr Abu Zayd (b. 1943) undertook “modernist attempts to subjugate 
Islamic modes of exegetical reasoning to a certain Western one,” attempts that “transgressed 
boundaries considered Islamically acceptable by his contemporaries.”
15
  Here, not only do 
the “modern” and the “Western” become synonymous, but Anjum unquestioningly accepts 
the claim, voiced by a certain segment of the Egyptian population, that this segment itself 
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 Ibid., 329.  
 
 
15
  Ovamir Anjum, “Islam as a Discursive Tradition: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors,” Comparative 
Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East  27, no.3 (2007): 663, emphasis added. 
 
8  
represents the heart of “real” Islam. 
 It is worth noting that the scholarly acceptance of these two entities, one Euro­
American and one Islamic, reifies these two traditions and denies their mutual historical 
imbrications.  Yet more significantly for my purposes, the contemporary positing of 
orthodoxy at the center of Islamic tradition relegates minority Islamic practice to a somehow 
less authentic position.  Current discussions of Islamic orthodoxy elide the fact that some 
Muslims have always denied other Muslims status as such. In the Shi`i Iranian context 
specifically, disputes (both physically violent and intellectual) between institutional Sufi 
groups and the legal (fiqh) establishment are well­documented.   The most famous example is 
that of the late­eighteenth century Ayatollah `Ali Bihbihani – known by the nickname 
Sufikush, the “Sufi killer.”
16
  (I will return to the historical debates over Sufism and Islamic 
jurisprudence in the Iranian context during my discussion of Soroush’s arguments.  The point 
I hope to have made here, however, is that the scholarly acceptance of particular claims to 
orthodoxy blinds us to the ways in which Muslims have contested not only “traditional 
authority,” but also which individuals and which readings of Islam constitute that very 
authority.  Iranian dissident arguments against the authority of the jurists cannot be read 
singularly within the context of the inexorable march of secularism over and against Islamic 
practices; instead, some attention at least must be paid to the ways in which Muslim 
secularisms re­imagine and re­articulate embedded and volatile contestations over religious 
subjects and rhetorical identifications.   
                                                 
 
16
 Nasrollah Pourjavady, “Opposition to Sufism in Twelver Schism,” in Islamic Mysticism Contested: 
Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics, ed. Frederick de Jong and Bernd Radtke (Boston: Brill, 
1999), 622­3; For another example of disputes within Islam over minority identifications, see, Sherman 
Jackson, On the Boundaries of Theological Tolerance in Islam: Abu Hamid al­Ghazali’s Faysal al­Tafriqa 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).   
 
9  
 Moving beyond Euro­American teleologies of secularization, in this paper I focus on 
the Islamic repertoires Muslims draw on to navigate contestations over the relationship 
between Islam and politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran.  In contesting the jurists’ 
assumption of political authority, Soroush and Shabestari locate themselves within long­
standing debates within Islamic traditions that prioritize inner states and self­conscious 
(rather than merely formal) practice over legal authority.    I suggest that the formation of the 
Islamic Republic highlighted a historically contested relationship between inner faith, law, 
and the state.  The works of Soroush and Shabestari exemplify this debate and require us to 
nuance received views of traditional authority, orthodox Islam, and the ways in which both 
the secular and Islamic tradition mediate Muslim experience in modernity.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
II.  Abdolkarim Soroush and Spiritual (Batini) Religiosity 
 Soroush presents a particularly interesting example here of the continuity of Islamic 
discourses within these dissident arguments because, while current scholarship has outlined 
the role of Euro­American philosophy in his writings, his engagement with specifically 
Islamic traditions has been largely overlooked.   Soroush himself was an early supporter of 
the Islamic republic who, like many Iranians, quickly became disillusioned with the new 
government.  During the 1990s, he began publicly critiquing the state though veiled 
discussions of the contingent nature of religious knowledge.  In these early epistemological 
arguments, Soroush drew on European philosophy of science to suggest that “all religious 
knowledge is contingent on external non­religious knowledge for its development and 
growth and likewise is subjected to flow in the sense that the context of its presuppositions is 
unfixed.”
17
  Soroush argued that because religious knowledge itself is limited and contingent, 
modern Muslims must analyze religious precepts in light of extra­religious reason.
18
 More 
recently, Soroush has called for the separation of religious and political authority, the 
separation of Islam from political systems of power.  In August 2006 Soroush suggested 
explicitly that “political secularism” is necessary in Iran. According to Soroush, by definition 
“political secularism has two major pillars.  One pillar consists of the question of legitimacy 
and the other consists of the political system’s neutrality towards religious and theoretical 
                                                 
17
 Ashk Dahlen, “Deciphering the meaning of revealed law: The Surushian paradigm in Shi`i 
epistemology” (Ph.D. diss., Acta Universitatis Upsalienes – Studia Iranica Upsaliensia, 2001), 285.  
 
18
  Abdolkarim Soroush, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings of Abdolkarim 
Soroush (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 133. 
 
11  
schools.  I believe that religious intellectuals have so far argued well that the system’s 
legitimacy hinges on justice, not on any particular type of religion, and the acceptance of the 
system comes from the people.”
 19
  
 Against the fiqh­based (or, legally­based) understandings of Islam that largely 
authorize the Islamic Republic, Soroush holds up the Iranian­Islamic tradition of `irfan 
(philosophical mysticism).
20
  Whereas one might, as Mahmood does above, locate the legal 
establishment as the orthodox center of Islamic religious practice, the history of `irfan 
demonstrates a ongoing contestation over this very center, a contestation which many of the 
religious reformists in Iran, and Soroush in particular, draw on in order to debate juridical 
authority.
21
  As an identifiable school of thought, `irfan bridges the categories of Sufi 
practice and Islamic philosophy.  Historically, the concept stems from centuries of 
contestation among Shi`i Muslims over the legitimacy of Sufi practice and identifies a school 
of thought located against practical institutionalized Sufism (tasavvof).
22
   
 The Iranian scholar Nasrollah Pourjavady highlights the polemical nature of these 
constructions and argues that Shi`i authors were almost uniformly opposed to Sufism prior to 
the thirteenth century.  Early Shi`i intellectuals viewed Sufism as “a form of Sunnism,” and 
                                                 
 
19
 Abdol Karim Soroush, “I am not the Reformists’ Godfather,” Shargh (20 August 2006), 
http://www.drsoroush.com/English/Interviews/E­INT­IAmNotTheReformistsGodfather.html (accessed 8 
December 2006), 5. 
 
20
 Scholars have offered a number of different translations for `irfan.  Here, I follow the suggestion of 
Carl Ernst and use the term “philosophical mysticism,” rather than “gnosis” or “theosophy,” to identify this set 
of discourses.   For a discussion of connotative problems in translating “`irfan”, see Carl Ernst, “Sufism and 
Philosophy in Mulla Sadra,” in Islam­West Philosophical Dialogue: The Papers presented at the World 
Congress on Mulla Sadra (May, 1999, Tehran) (Tehran: Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Institute, 2001): 
173­192.    
 
 
21
 For another discussion of `irfan theories of guardianship, see Mohsen Kadivar, Hokumat­e Velayi 
(Tehran, Iran: Nashrani, 1999).   
 
22
 Gerhard Bowering, “`Erfān,” Encyclopaedia Iranica http://www.iranica.com/newsite/, accessed 22 
April 2006. 
12  
outside the bounds of Shi`i practice.  The eleventh century author Jamal al­Din al­Murtada 
al­Razi echoed the sentiment of this early period and argued, “‘the Sufis are Sunnis, and all 
the Sunnis consider them to be saints (awliyā’) and people of miraculous deeds.’”
23
  
Following the fall of Baghdad in the thirteenth century, several Shi`i authors, such as Sayyid 
Haydar­i Amuli (b. 1320), began to “incorporate Sufi ideas, especially the doctrine of Ibn 
`Arabi (d.638/1240) into Shi`i theology and philosophy.”
24
  While the Safavid period (1501­
1736) witnessed the life of one of the preeminent masters of `irfan, Sadra al­Din al­Shirazi 
(d. 1640), it also saw a violent move on the part of the Safavid state against institutional Sufi 
orders.  On the one hand, both Shahs Safi (r. 1629­1642) and `Abbas II (r. 1642­66) showed 
great interest in Sufi topics and, in attempting to limit the control of the “clerical elite,” both 
admitted `ulama’ with Sufi leanings to high circles of power.
25
  On the other, the reign of 
Shah Safi in particular saw numerous messianic uprisings that initially curtailed Safi’s own 
interest in Sufism.
26
  Both the well­known Shi’i scholar Fayz­e Kashani (d. 1679) and Sadra 
al­Din al­Shirazi himself spoke “of the ways in which the popularization of Sufism and the 
dervish cult were creating social discord” and distinguished themselves from the 
exaggerationist (ghuluw) groups of mystics.
27
  Although the incorporation of `irfan into Shi`i 
theology was immediately positioned against institutionalized Sufism, the disassociation of 
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 Pourjavady,  614­5. 
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 Ibid., 619. 
 
 
25
 Rula Jardi Abissab, Converting Persia: Religion and Power in the Safavid Empire (New  
York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 119. 
  
 
26
 Andrew J. Newman, Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian Empire (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 73­
78. 
 
 
27
 Kathryn Babayan, Mystics Monarchs and Messiahs: Cultural Landscapes of Early  
Modern Iran (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 417. 
 
13  
`irfan from Sufism was incomplete.  Indeed, Pourjavady seems to suggest that the 
designation of `irfan as opposed to Sufism may, in some cases, have been a purely defensive 
measure, a terminological choice designed to “avoid the negative connotations” of Sufism.
28
   
  While for much of its history `irfan was an elite discourse, revolving around the 
writings of Ibn `Arabi and Sadra al­Din al­Shirazi, in the twentieth century these discourses 
became increasingly public and political.
29
  According to Alexander Knysh, Khomeini 
himself delved deeply into `irfan traditions – he not only studied Sadra al­Din al­Shirazi’s 
Ketab al­Asfar, but wrote his own treatises on `irfan.
 30
 Matthijs Van den Bos has suggested 
as well that following Khomeini’s death in 1989, the Islamic Republic attempted to ground 
its own authenticity in `irfan language and to re­imagine Khomeini as the preeminent 
practitioner of `irfan for the modern Iranian nation.
31
   Hamid Algar, a noted scholar of Iran 
and follower of Khomeini, positions Khomeini as beyond the level of the marja`­e taqlid (the 
Shi`i source of emulation), and instead as a “perfect person” fusing religion and politics.
32
 
Even this past summer, the Iranian newspaper Hamshari published a piece entitled “A brief 
                                                 
28
 Pourjavady, 621. 
 
 
29
 Leonard Lewisohn, for example, notes the ways in which a number of Iranian Sufi orders become 
involved in publishing important texts during the twentieth century (see, Leonard Lewisohn, “An Introduction 
to the History of Modern Persian Sufism, Part II: A Socio­Cultural Profile of Sufism, from the Dhahabī Revival 
to the Present Day,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. 62, No. 1 (1999), 45­6) ­ I have 
seen no work to date on the ways in which print culture, and specifically the establishment of publishing 
industries and increasing literacy in Iran, have impacted the reception of these discourses in twentieth and 
twenty­first century Iran 
 
 
30
 Alexander Knysh, “Irfan Revisited: Khomeini and the Legacy of Islamic Mystical Philosophy,” 
Middle East Journal 46:4 (1992), 635­6.  
 
 
31
 Matthjis Van den Bos, Mystic Regimes: Sufism and the State in Iran, from the Late Qajar Era to the 
Islamic Republic (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 171.  
 
 
32
 Hamid Algar, Roots of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (Oneonta, New York: Islamic Publications 
International, 2001), 42. 
 
14  
look at the mystical (`irfani) and philosophical thought of Imam Khomeini,” which detailed 
Khomeini’s own engagements with `irfan.
33
 
 In the 1990s, anti­state discourses arose that themselves drew on `irfan categories in 
order to contest the Islamic Republic’s oversight of appropriate Islamic practice.  While the 
Islamic republic (specifically, the Islamic Republic’s theorization and institutionalization of 
the guardianship of the jurist), prioritizes Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) as the heart of Islamic 
worship, Soroush argues that a model of religiosity offered by `irfan is most appropriate for a 
secular government and post­occultation society.   Here, I focus largely on a 1998 article of 
Soroush’s, “Spiritual Guardianship and Political Guardianship” (“valayat­e batini va valayat­
e siyasi”).
34
  In this article, Soroush draws on Islamic philosophical mysticism (`irfan) to 
contest the Islamic Republic’s reading of both velayat (guardianship), as linked to the 
authority of the state, and of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), as the prioritized identification of 
the religious subject. 
 Soroush’s essay “Spiritual Guardianship and Political Guardianship,” draws upon two 
central questions from the history of Shi`i theology: who represents the Imams during the 
post­occultation period and what elements of the Imams’ authority devolve upon those 
representatives?  Soroush’s dissident political claim, focused against the authority of the 
jurists, is the following: (1) the Shi`i Imams possessed both the absolute spiritual (batini) 
authority and limited political (siyasi) authority; (2) the conjunction of political and spiritual 
authority was unique to the Imams; and therefore, (3) during the occultation the Iranian Shi`a 
                                                 
 
33
 Hamshahri, “A brief look at the `Irfani and philosophical thought of Imam Khomeini,” 
http://www.hamshahrionline.ir/News/?id=56730 (accessed December 8, 2008). 
 
 
34
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must turn to rational methods of government – specifically to political democracy.   This 
argument revolves around a separation of religious from political authority (Soroush’s 
secularist claim) embedded in `irfan categories. 
Semantic Slips: Valayat and Velayat  
 Soroush critiques the current instantiation of the Islamic Republic by linking 
velayat/valayat (to the Imams and denying juridical claims to represent the Hidden Imam in 
his absence.   In the article “Spiritual Guardianship and Political Guardianship,” Soroush 
contrasts the velayat­e faqih (the guardianship of the jurists) with the valayat of the Imams.  
He argues that “the guardianship of the jurist has no part of `irfani and spiritual valayat...and 
the word is only used so that a group [of people] can mix this velayat (which 
means…political leadership) with that valayat (which is suitable for and specific to the 
friends of God and the elite of His threshold).  It is better thus for this to use the phrase 
‘political rule of the jurist’ (ze`amat­e faqih) so that the sophistical associations [of the 
jurists] might collapse.”
35
 
 This simple exposition, however, belies a much deeper field of meaning.  Vincent 
Cornell notes that in Sufi discourse “walaya [valayat] and wilaya [velayat] are best seen as 
semantic fraternal twins that coexist symbolically…Each relies on the other for its 
meaning.”
36
  This coexistence, as Cornell puts it, revolves around grammatical and 
theological debates over the precise meaning of these two terms.  For example, while Ibn 
Kathir defined velayat in terms of authority and valayat in terms of closeness to God, the 
fourteenth century Indian Sufi Nizam al­Din Awliya’ reversed Ibn Kathir’s distinctions and 
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argued “it is wilaya that connotes closeness or love, whereas walaya connotes authority.”  In 
Nizam al­Din Awliya’s words, “‘that which takes place between the Shaykh and God is 
called wilayat.  That is a special kind of love…His walayat, on the other hand, he can confer 
on someone else, whomever he wishes.’”
37
  
 While Cornell noted long­standing Sufi debates over the exact connotations of 
valayat and velayat (i.e., which connotes authority and which proximity to God), Soroush 
draws on `irfan theories to define the friend of god as both close to God and as a figure of 
absolute authority.  The figure of the vali, linked to both Iranian `irfan and to theological 
status of the Imams, is the central figure of Soroush’s critique.  Here, the contested semantic 
field at the root of the Islamic Republic’s velayat­e faqih opens up and presents a path for a 
complex dissident discourse of personal Islamic spirituality outside the confines of state 
oversight and juridical authority.   
 In Soroush’s discussion of guardianship (velayat), he draws a pivotal distinction 
between spiritual (batini) and political (siyasi) guardianship.  Soroush places himself 
squarely in the discourses of `irfan ­ citing specifically Ibn `Arabi, Sadr al­Din al­Shirāzi, 
and Jalāl al­Din Rumi among others.
38
  Soroush identifies the central figure of spiritual 
guardianship (velayat­e batini) as the friend of God (vali).    Defining `irfan as Ibn `Arabi’s 
theories of divine manifestation, Soroush suggests the “perfect person” (ensan­e kamel) is the 
manifestation of all the divine names.”
39
  As the reflection of God in the world, the friend of 
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God is so close to God that he is defined by “annihilation in God and existing through God.”  
Moreover, one of the main points of Rumi’s Masnavi, Soroush argues, is that a person cannot 
practice on his or her own without the consultation of a guide.  Without the “shade” or the 
guardianship of a religious leader, it is impossible for an individual to reach God.
40
  This 
guide’s authority is absolute and, in this context, “testing the Sheikh and raising objections 
are absolutely inadmissible.”
41
  While Soroush clearly cites the Sunni origins of these 
theories, he notes as well that in the Shi`i context `irfan discourses have identified the friend 
of god as the Imams.
42
  As Henri Corbin noted, “For Shiism…the final phase of prophecy 
(nubūwah) was the initial phase of a new cycle, the cycle of walāyah or Imamate….The 
word actually means friendship, protection.  They are the ‘Friends of God’….; strictly 
speaking, they are the prophets and the Imams.”
43
  It is here, as Soroush links `irfan theories 
of religiosity and obedience to central Shi`i discussions of the Imamate, that his critique of 
the Islamic Republic becomes the most forceful.   
 As suggested by the title of Soroush’s article “spiritual guardianship and political 
guardianship,” Soroush separates the political authority of the Imams from their spiritual 
authority. He argues that while their absolute spiritual authority stems from their status as 
friends of God, their status as Imams relates to a limited political authority.  The conjunction 
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of political and spiritual authority, Soroush argues in an implicit critique of the Islamic 
Republic, ended with the occultation of the Twelfth Imam.
44
  
 Soroush’s argument for a rationalist democratic politics, therefore, relies upon the 
delineation of two spheres of authority: spiritual and political.  Yet even here it is worth 
noting that this very separation of religious and political authority is not merely a secularist 
intervention.  Khomeini himself argued: “To prove that government and authority belong to 
the Imam is not to imply that the Imam has no spiritual status.  The Imam does indeed 
possess certain spiritual dimensions that are unconnected with his function as ruler.”
 45
  
While Khomeini argued for the authority of the jurists in the Imam’s absence,  Soroush’s 
argument that the conjunction of these two spheres in the Imams was unique and ended with 
the occultation of the Twelfth Imam, clears space for a secular government – one removed 
from the religious­legal establishment of Islamic jurists.  Soroush’s arguments on the whole 
are embedded in long­standing debates over authority (both religious and political) in post­
occultation Shi`i Islam.  The central debate that lies behind Soroush’s essay is two­pronged: 
who represents the Imams during the post­occultation period and what elements of the 
Imams’ authority devolve upon those representatives?   
 As we have seen, Khomeini’s theory of velayat­e faqih, and the Islamic Republic’s 
institutionalization of that theory, argued for the authority of the jurists as the deputies of the 
Hidden Imam.
46
   Khomeini’s theory was in fact innovative, and represented a drastic change 
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in terms of the standard and prior articulations of jurists’ authority – it is these debates that 
Soroush’s essay draws upon and is inserted into.  Despite Khomeini’s claim to the absolute 
authority of the jurists, Muslim scholars have debated the extent of the guardianship of the 
fuqaha’ since the occultation of the twelfth Imam in the late ninth century.
47
  Instead of 
absolute authority, the jurists prior to Khomeini generally allotted themselves a “relative” 
guardianship.  This theory of relative guardianship relegated to the jurists the responsibility 
"of their exercising a juridical supervisory function over matters for which no legally 
responsible individual could be identified."
48
  The often cited cases here would be those 
involving orphans and the insane;
49
 in short, a quite delineated subset of the population in 
comparison to the authoritative governmental guardianship institutionalized in the Islamic 
Republic.  
 As Said Amir Arjomand noted, the Islamic Republic propagated a specific 
understanding of velayat­e faqih and, in the 1980s, made “statements to the effect that 
obedience to the clergy as ‘those in authority’ (Koran IV. 59; a term hitherto invariably taken 
to refer to the twelve Infallible Imams in the Shi`ite tradition) is incumbent upon the believer 
as a religious duty were often excerpted from the will and made into headlines in bold 
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letters.”
50
  Historically, Shi`i political theory had been rather inclined to recognize the 
realities of political power outside of the legal establishment.  For one, the late nineteenth 
century Ayatollah Mirza Hassan Shirazi, one the most important legal scholar of the Qajar 
period, assumed a “two swords” theory of power in which political authority and spiritual 
authority rest in two separate hands.
51
 Noted jurists of the nineteenth century offered 
interpretations of juridical authority that explicitly contradict those later articulated by 
Khomeini in the 1960s.  As Said Amir Arjomand notes,  “Shaykh Mortaza Ansari (d. 1865), 
the most important jurist of the second half of the nineteenth century…sought first, ‘to 
demonstrate how absurd it is to reason that because the Imams should be obeyed in all 
temporal and spiritual matters, the faqihs are also entitled to such obedience; and second . . . 
that in principle no individual, except the Prophet and the [infallible] Imam, has the authority 
to exert wilaya [Arabic variant of velayat] over others.’”
52
  As several scholars have shown, 
the practical reach of the jurists’ authority, as well as the theological claims associated with 
that authority, drastically increased during the eighteenth and nineteenth century with more 
central collection of religious taxes (khums) and the theological construction of theories of 
marja`­e taqlid – the notion of a single pre­eminent jurist for each generation who would 
guide the community in religious matters.
53
  Based on this increasing assumption of authority 
during the Qajar period, the noted scholar of Iran, Hamid Algar, has suggested that the 
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Iranian revolution and Khomeini’s theory of guardianship represent the natural evolution of 
Shi’i political theory, such that the assumption of political authority by Khomeini represents 
the final grappling with the “practical implications” of the Twelfth Imam’s occultation.
54
  Yet 
while it is true that the post­Safavid period saw the increasing authority of Muslim jurists, 
even during the Qajar period the `ulama’ had largely assumed the position of representing 
the Imam alongside, rather than in the absence, of the authority of extent political leaders.
55
   
 In Soroush’s essay on velayat, he supports in certain ways this earlier reading – 
suggesting that the holders of spiritual authority are purely the Imams, without reference to 
the legal scholars.  Soroush’s argument, therefore, that contemporary Shi`i Iranians ought to 
separate the spiritual and political authorities of the Imams in constructing models of political 
rule, relates to a prior precedent through which non­secularist figures, even ones so heavily 
invested in the rule of the jurists as Khomeini, themselves dissected the Imams’ authority 
along these lines.  The separation of these two modalities, therefore, is not merely a secularist 
intervention to disaggregate political and religious systems of authority (though it is that), but 
it is equally embedded in post­occultation debates over who represents the Hidden Imam.   
Spiritual (batini) Religiosity and Secularist Hermeneutics  
 To return briefly to Mahmood’s reading of Islamic tradition, Mahmood argues: “the 
project of a secular hermeneutics, and the form of discipline and rule it inaugurates, finds its 
telos in precisely a subject who recognizes the material expressions of a particular religion – 
its rituals, observances, laws, and scriptures – are linked only contingently to religious truth.”  
Instead of “material expressions,” secularist hermeneutics insist upon a “symbolic” view of 
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religion. In imperialist readings religion becomes not the literal word of God, but a system of 
symbols blind to the field of politics and embodied subjectivity.
56
   Construed broadly, 
Soroush does posit spiritual (batini) guardianship as more central and enduring than political 
(siyasi) guardianship.  Soroush argues that, during the occultation, the Hidden Imam “gives 
spiritual and inner guidance to people, not political leadership, from behind the veil.  He 
takes their hands and indirectly (in absence) takes them toward God and he has those same 
qualities that the `arefs [masters of `irfan] have spoken of in terms of the friends (‘awliya) of 
God.”
57
   It is the political and external guardianship that ends with the occultation of the 
Hidden Imam; the spiritual and inner valayat of the Imams remains.  Soroush’s secularist 
critique does indeed contest and deny the relevance of juridical claims (of fiqh) for 
contemporary Shi`i Iranians.   
 This contestation, however, does not assume the irrelevance of “rituals, observances, 
laws, and scriptures,” but does assert the primacy of certain inner, spiritual, relationships to 
God and the Hidden Imam.  This is a valuation that in fact has much in common with prior 
`irfan discourse in terms of the hierarchical ranking of formal practice against inner states.  
On the one hand, Ibn `Arabi himself emphasized the necessity of formal practice.  As 
William Chittick notes, an individual “must discipline himself according to the norms of the 
Shari`a and the Ṭarīqa (the spiritual path) under the direction of a spiritual master or ‘shaykh’ 
who has himself traversed the path…[The] ‘godfearingness’ which prepares the disciple for 
God’s teaching entails his complete absorption in putting the revealed Law into practice and 
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invoking (dhikr) the name of God under a shaykh’s guidance.”
58
  Yet Chittick notes as well 
that while Ibn `Arabi emphasized the role of formal practice in moving towards Truth, even 
his immediate commentators (such as the thirteenth century scholar Qunawi) focused instead 
on the philosophical aspects of Ibn `Arabi’s theory, often called vahdat­e vojud.  Chittick 
notes this bias as well in academic work on Ibn `Arabi, citing the work of Toshihiko Itzutsu 
and Henry Corbin specifically: “Where both authors come together is in failing to bring out 
the practical sides to Ibn al­‘Arabī’s teachings and his insistence on weighing all knowledge 
in the ‘Scale of Law,’ the norms revealed through the Koran and the Sunna of the Prophet.”
 59
  
While Chittick’s critique here is useful in reorienting our understanding of Ibn `Arabi’s own 
work, his evaluation of its reception history highlights the ways in which `irfan discourses, 
drawn from these later commentators, themselves have focused on philosophical truths over 
practical application, a move highlighted in Soroush’s own presentation.  Indeed, the notable 
revolutionary figure Morteza Motahhari (d. 1979), one of the founding figures of the Islamic 
Republic, foreshadows Soroush’s own valuation of inner experience over formal practice.  
Motahhari, in detailing the relationship between the fourteenth century Persian Sufi poet 
Hafez and ‘irfan philosophies, argues that external practices are worthless without subduing 
the inner self (nafs).
60
  He argued that “the `urafa’ of the past spoke of the theory of arriving 
at Truth and encountering God (liqa’ allah), and they understood all laws (sharaye`)  as 
being for just such a goal and conclusion.”  Motahhari did value external practice ­ he 
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defined `irfan itself as “a practice consisting of traversing the stages of practices (suluk) from 
the beginning to the end; in other words, it is the states and stations (maqamat) of the human 
(insan) from the beginning of the stage of awakening (tanabbuh) and wakefulness (bidari) to 
the last stage, which is annihilation in god (fana’ fi allah) and remaining/living through god 
(baqa’ billah).”
61
  The role of practice (suluk) here is not incidental.  Yet it exists within a 
hierarchical framing in which “all laws” are geared towards disciplining the inner self.  
Soroush draws on and extends these earlier discourses so that, in critiquing legal oversight, 
he posits a turn to “prophetic experiences,” higher levels of tasting and unveiling associated 
with Sufi experiences.  Soroush argues that “the prophets have laid down the path of 
prophetic experience for their communities and followers,” one which encompasses “the 
instructions of worship that have entered religion, such as waking for prayer in the night 
(tahajjod), fasting, prayer, giving alms, being generous (enfaq).”  Yet these formal practices 
are not valued in their own right but as “parts of the prescriptions that open for people the 
inner door of `irfani and prophetic experiences.”  Most forcibly, Soroush notes this 
hierarchical reading of the modalities of religious practice, not as a turn to religious 
experience without external practice, nor as a merely symbolic reading of Islam, but rather as 
a clear mystical path on which “the condition for imitating the prophet is imitating his 
experiences, not only following his commands and prohibitions.”
62
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III. Mohammad Mojtahid Shabestari and the Practice of Adab 
 I have suggested that a number of Iranian dissident intellectuals orient their critiques 
of the Islamic Republic largely as a critique of Islamic jurisprudence, drawing on registers 
from within the Islamic tradition that reprioritize the authority of Muslim jurists.  However, 
not all these dissident scholars voice their critiques in the same way, nor do they all draw on 
the same Islamic sources.   Like Soroush, Mujtahid Muhammad Shabestari contests the 
authority of the jurists, and the role of fiqh, in regulating Muslim religiosity.  Unlike Soroush 
however, and as an example of the multiple and divergent traditions within Islam, Shabestari 
does not base his critique in post­occultation theology and ‘irfan, but rather contests the 
entanglement of Islamic jurisprudence in politics (siyasa) as detrimental to both 
jurisprudence and spiritually meaningful embodied worship.    
 Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Mujtahid Shabestari (b. 1936) supported the Islamic 
Republic early on and served in the Majles (Parliament) for a term.  Like many Iranians, he 
quickly became disillusioned with the new government.  During the 1990s, Shabestari 
became part of the “Kiyan circle,” a group of intellectuals (including Soroush) who published 
reformist articles in the monthly journal Kiyan.  Shabestari’s critiques in particular focused 
on questions of hermeneutics and the multiplicity of interpretations of religious texts.
63
  Like 
Soroush, Shabestari critiques religious bases for democratic government.  Counter to several 
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of Shabestari’s critics who suggested that equality of religions, democracy unbound by “the 
laws of god,” and the “anthropological presuppositions” of democracy contradict Islam, 
Shabestari argues that the choice Iranian Muslims must make is “not between Islamic and 
non­Islamic democracy, but between democracy and dictatorship.”
64
 According to 
Shabestari, if the state takes on responsibility for propagating religion, “it will promote a 
particular interpretation of religion, since without some kind of interpretation, the promotion 
of religion is impossible.”
65
 Shabestari’s political critique is not only focused on the reality of 
multiple interpretations of Islam, but significantly on the independence of the ‘ulama’ 
(religious scholars).  He suggests that “the preservation of the independence of religion and 
the independence of the ‘ulama’ of religion, from the perspective of protecting and 
respecting religion, is an indisputable and definite duty.”
66
  Similarly to Soroush, 
Shabestari’s understanding of a “democracy of Muslims” against “Islamic democracy” does 
not imply that religious sentiments would not affect the political establishment, but rather 
that religious authorities, namely the fuqaha’ (legal scholars) would be disconnected from the 
state apparatus.
67
   
Constructing the State and Enforcing Moral Order 
 Shabestari’s critique of the Islamic Republic delineates the boundaries of 
jurisprudential reason, a mode of reasoning that he retains as significant, but ultimately reads 
as detrimental to both Muslim religiosity and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) itself when tied to 
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the governing power of the state.  His critique here is not of Islamic jurisprudence in its 
entirety, but rather of jurisprudence when tied to the worldly powers of the state.   As noted 
above, the expansion of the Islamic Republic’s authority is linked to Khomeini’s re­
imagining of the relationship between Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and the state.  In 
particular, Khomeini called for a newly politicized Islam, one that denies the removal of any 
realm from religious injunctions.  In the introduction to Khomeini’s The Rule of the Jurist 
(Velayat­e Faqih), he exhorts his readers to “introduce Islam to the people so that…they 
don’t imagine …[the legal scholars] have nothing to do with politics (siyasat).  This idea that 
religion (diyanat) must be separated from politics and the scholars (‘ulama’) of Islam must 
not become involved in social and political matters is voiced and spread by imperialists.”
68
   
Abd al­Hakeem Carney, analyzing transformations in Muslim discourses during the 
twentieth century, reads Khomeini’s arguments as the sacralization of Muslim political 
activity.  He suggests that Islamists employ a “secular/theocratic” dichotomy in which 
“secularism becomes the antithesis of Islam, as Islam has never relegated religion to the 
private sphere.”
69
  Khomeini, for example, regards this denial of division between religion 
and politics within Muslim society as both “’necessary and self­evident.’”
70
  Within the 
Islamic Republic itself, government agencies that “invade the lives of private individuals and 
attack their personal preferences” justify their actions “by appeal to the imperative of 
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enjoining the good and forbidding evil as stated in Article Eight of the constitution.”
71
  This 
Article reads,  
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, commanding the good and forbidding the evil 
(al­amr bilma`ruf wa al­nahy `an al­munkar) is a universal and reciprocal 
duty that must be fulfilled by the people with respect to one another, by the 
government with respect to the people, and by the people with respect to the 
government. The conditions, limits, and nature of this duty will be specified 
by law…. 
72
  
 
Article Eight suggests explicitly that the responsibility to pursue the moral perfection of 
Iranian society resides not only in individual citizens, but in the state as well.  This Article 
“grounds the laws governing the rights and duties of the security forces and police.”
73
  Kar 
suggests that by referencing the moral authority of this Qur’anic command to “command the 
good and forbid evil,” the Iranian state uses religion authorize its surveillance of citizens’ 
personal and public lives.   
 The governmental regulation of behavior is not a complete innovation within Islamic 
contexts; yet historically, the boundaries between Islamic jurisprudence and the state have 
been much more complex than suggested by either Khomeini or the Iranian state. In certain 
ways the Islamic Republic has expanded (greatly) the pre­modern role of the Islamic market 
regulator (muhtasib) to “command good and forbid evil.”  Yet in pre­modern contexts, the 
role of the market regulator was strictly limited.  Mottahedeh and Stilt, in analyzing the 
writings of Muhammd Ghazali (d. 1111) and Ibn al­Ukhuwah (d. 1329) on the market 
regulator, suggest that these theorists of the state’s role in enforcing morality understood an 
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individual as carrying “his privacy with him.”  An example Mottahedeh and Stilt raise is the 
drinking of wine.  In terms of the individual home, a market regulator had no authority (at 
least in these theoretical discussions) to enter a quiet home in search of wine drinking.  If the 
market regulator however heard noises of drunkenness from the street, then his authority 
permitted him to enter the house, but only if he were certain of the activities going on.  In the 
street, an individual might roam freely with a bottle of wine in his coat as long as “there was 
no ‘particular sign’” of the prohibited bottle.
 74
  
 Frank Vogel adds to this argument in suggesting that legally a market regulator could 
enforce only a “categorical sharia [Islamic law] principle” that required no interpretation on 
the part of the market regulator. Vogel’s analysis compares the writings of the eleventh 
century scholar al­Mawardi (d. 1058) to the actions of the contemporary Saudi state.  Al­
Mawardi argued for the essentially limited nature of the state’s authority (and the market 
regulator’s authority as the hand of the state) to enforce public morality.  According to al­
Mawardi, the market regulator “’has no right to force his conviction on the people or to hold 
them to his opinion in religious matters (din), given that ijtihad [independent reasoning] is to 
be encouraged.’”
75
  In order to maintain space for free debate on most issues of Islamic law, 
al­Mawardi limits the authority of the state to regulate morality to only a handful of issues 
about which all religious scholars agreed. 
      The Islamic Republic extends this pre­modern oversight of both bodily comportment and 
religious reason.  As Kar suggests, the surveillance machine of the Islamic Republic not only 
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records telephone conversations of dissident writers, but also extends its moral authority to 
matters of dress and association both inside and outside the home.
76 
The Islamic Republic 
assumes the activities of sanctioned religious reasoning as part of the state apparatus.  While 
the eleventh century scholar al­Mawardi placed independent reasoning (ijtihad) in the hands 
of individual legal scholars and allowed the market regulator (muhtasib) authority only on 
issues that required no interpretation, the Islamic Republic positions numerous regulative 
bodies to control and condemn non­sanctioned legal reasoning.   One of the least discussed, 
though perhaps most institutionally innovative, bodies of the Iranian state is the “Special 
Court for Clergy” (Dadgah­e Vizhe­ye Ruhaniyun).  The Special Court for Clergy polices the 
writings of Iranian religious legal scholars and, when finding their positions at odds with the 
authorized position of the Islamic Republic, has sentenced major dissident legal scholars to 
prison over the last ten years.
77
  It is this legal instantiation of the state’s religious authority to 
enforce both particular readings of appropriate Muslim practice and religious thought that 
many Iranian dissidents condemn.     
 Shabestari, in contradistinction to Khomeini and the institutional formation of the 
Islamic Republic, locates his critique against the equation of political activity with religious 
practice and, in particular, against the logical coherency of contemporary political fiqh.  
Shabestari concedes to the Islamic Republic that the orders (amr­ha) and prohibitions (nahi­
ha) referenced in Article Eight of the constitution represent integral aspects of Muslim 
religiosity.  Contrary to Soroush’s positing of an ‘irfani religiosity, Shabestari argues that the 
majority of Muslims orient their religiosity not around ‘irfan (which he suggests is based on 
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“love” (eshq)), but rather around following the “commands and prohibitions of God (amr va 
nahi­ye khodavand).”
78
  He argues that “the spiritual message, which the community of 
Muslims took from the prophetic mission of the messenger of Islam, was a message of orders 
and prohibitions.”  He also allows that in the past Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) “clarified the 
orders and prohibitions of God and fulfilled the most central religious need of the public.”
79
   
 Yet Shabestari argues that while the orders and prohibitions relevant to worship and 
social duties remain pertinent to contemporary Muslim life, Islamic constructions of politics 
require serious reformations. In formulating this critique Shabestari notes a “taxonomy of 
three kinds of orders (avamar) and prohibitions (nahi­ha) in the Islamic religion – worship 
(‘ibadat), social transactions (mu’amalat), and politics (siyasat),” which are “linked to the 
faqihs (legal scholars),” but also ultimately “in agreement with the Holy Qur’an and the 
tradition (sunnat) of the Prophet.”
80
  Under each of these headings, worship, social 
transactions, and politics, Shabestari groups a certain subset of activities so that matters of 
devotion (`ibadat) pertains to activities “like prayer, fasting, alms, and pilgrimage,” social 
transactions (mu`amalat) pertain to activities “like marriage, divorce, buying, and selling,” 
and siyasat (a complex term that I’ll return to shortly, but which could be defined here either 
as “politics” broadly or as “punishment” in specific legal contexts) pertains to activities “like 
punishing stealing, retaliation, compensation for manslaughter, penal laws, and the rules of 
general guardianship.”
81
  Shabestari argues that the issue is that the orders and prohibitions 
                                                 
 
78
 Mohammad Mojtahid Shabestari, “Political Jurisprudence has forfeited its Rational Basis (fiqh­e 
siyasi bastar­e `aqlai­ye khod ra az dast dadeh ast)”, in Naqdi bar Qira’at­ha­ye Rasmi az Din (A Critique of 
the Official Reading of Religion) (Tehran, Iran: Tarh­e No, 2006b), 162.   
 
 
79
 Ibid., 163. 
 
 
80
 Ibid., 161. 
 
 
81
 Ibid., 163­4.   
32  
touted by Islamic legal scholars in the realm of politics do not apply to the present Iranian 
context.  He suggests that 
on the issue of devotional acts and social transactions, the original framework 
of the suggestions and religious opinions of legal scholars (fatwas) still agrees 
with the rational foundation [of Islamic jurisprudence] and in the present age 
no logical reason necessitates that the original framework of Islamic 
devotional acts or social transactions be put aside….On the issue of politics 
(siyasat), the matter is completely the opposite….in the present age, most of 
the suggestions and religious opinions of legal scholars (fatwas) on the issue 
of politics (siyasat) do not have a rational explanation.
82
 
 
Rather than directly attacking the interventionist state of the Islamic Republic, Shabestari 
complains that the problem with religious conceptions of politics (siyasat) is not simply a 
problem of putting eternal divine orders and prohibitions into effect in the twentieth and 
twenty­first centuries (contemporary politics have nothing to do with taking vengeance for 
killings, tribal relations, and allegiance (bay`at) to a single ruler).
83
  Instead, Shabestari 
suggests that democratic processes present simply the best political system.  Religious 
opinions (fatwa) that contradict the freedom and equality at the root of the democratic system 
must simply be re­examined in order to uncover the compatibility of Muslim religious life 
with democratic politics.  It is these democratic processes, rather than any anthropology they 
may presuppose, that represent the best life for Muslims.
 84
  Shabestari conflates specially 
legal (fiqhi) readings of siyasa, as punishment, with a broader meaning connoting “politics.”  
And then, based on this conflation, he cedes the political authority of the jurists (as 
overseeing both punishment and politics) to secular imaginaries.   
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 In Shabestari’s argument we do in fact witness a clearing of intellectual space for 
secular democratic government. However, even here this move represents not merely a 
secularist imposition, but rather opens up the historically complex relationship between the 
authority of legal scholars and the realm of siyasa, a term used to define both politics and 
punishment.   On the one hand, in contradistinction to Islamist attempts to conjoin religion 
and politics, Abbas Amanat has suggested as well that in pre­modern contexts a 
jurisprudence of neither punishment nor politics (al­fiqh­i al­siyasi) existed.
85
   Carney has 
suggested as well that “it has been commonplace for Muslim thinkers…to posit their own 
bipolar distinctions inside their communities: between millat (the religious nation) and 
dawlat (the state)…[and] between shari`ah (divine law) and siyasah (politics).”
86
  
Institutionally, he suggests, “throughout history there has always been a clear divide between 
these domains, particularly in the court system, where shari`ah judges would always stand 
alongside ‘secular’ (meaning, in this case, non­shariah) courts, which often did the bulk of 
the work.”
87
  
 Yet even Carney acknowledges the fact of the matter is that state law, particularly in 
the realm of “siyasat,” encompassed punishment alone while religious judges often oversaw 
marital, business, and numerous other disputes.  Carney’s easy division also denies more 
theological tensions, as religious scholars prior to the twentieth century often debated the 
extent of their role in social and political life – whether or not in fact they had the power and 
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position to make good on those theoretical constructs.
88
  Distinctions between siyasa and 
shari`a  were never firmly delineated and the ascription of various sets of authorities over 
sisyasa has also been common place.  Part of the issue here in understanding the category of 
“siyasa” and its role in Islamic thought, is that of overlapping sets of terminology.  The 
Encyclopedia of Islam highlights three different discourses surrounding this term: that of the 
philosophers, the legal scholars, and contemporary, perhaps more strictly “political,” 
situations.
89
  One, is the category of “siyāsa shar`iyya,” identified as a particularly “Sunni 
constitutional and legal doctrine…calling for harmonization between the law and procedures 
of Islamic jurisprudence (fiḳh) and the practical demands of governance (siyasa).”  
Associated with Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), this theory advanced “a more expansive vision for 
fiḳh” than had previously been articulated by Muslim scholars.
90
  In contrast, the noted 
contemporary scholar Muhammad Hashim Kamali suggests in his study of Islamic 
jurisprudence (in obvious contrast to Shabestari’s categorization), that Muslim scholars 
classify religious “orders and prohibitions” according to only two categories: matters of 
worship (‘ibadat), which include such things as daily prayer, and matters of transactions or 
social duties (mu’amalat).
91
  However, little research has been done on specifically Shi`i 
views on Islamic Jurisprudence.  One of the few is Hossein Modarressi Tabataba’i’s An 
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Introduction to Shi`i Law: A Bibliographical Study.  Tabataba’i suggests that a variety of 
approaches exist in both Shi`i and Sunni legal circles and points to Fayz­e Kashani as having 
a unique approach. Fayz­e Kashani (d. 1679 ), one of the seminal figures in Shi`i legal and 
theological debates, divides Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) into two sections: “one on acts of 
devotion and social duties (al­‘ibadat wa’l­siyasat) and the other on ordinary affairs and 
transactions (al­‘adat wa’l­mu’amalat).”
92
  While Fayz­e Kashani’s terms mirror 
Shabestari’s in some ways, though not in the divisions, Kashani’s combining of devotional 
acts (‘ibadat) and social duties (siyasat) seems to point to an entirely different moral 
economy than Shabestari’s construction.
93
 
 The second usage suggested by the Encyclopedia of Islam is a limited usage given the 
term by Muslim philosophers, such as al­Farabi (d. 950), who drew on Greek philosophy and 
prioritized rationalist philosophical ends, such that they “often elevated siyasa above sharī`a 
in importance.”
94
  The third, and perhaps most significant, reading of siyasa is  “in the sense 
of statecraft, the management of affairs of state and eventually,” in modern contexts, “that of 
politics and political policy.”
 95
  Ibn al­Mukaffa (d. 757) presents the most significant 
element of “statecraft” in the early periods for our purposes.  He suggests, “siyasa is the 
discretionary authority of the ruler and his officials, one which they exercise outside the 
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framework of the shari’a [Islamic religious law].”
 96
    Closest to this reading is the 
vernacular reading in contemporary Persian of “siyasat” as simply “politics.”  The dictionary 
Farhang­e Ruz­e Sokhan, published in 2004/2005 (1383H) includes five definitions of 
siyasat, but none that link it to matters of punishment.  Rather, siyasat is simply “matters 
connected to the administration of a country and its relations with foreign states (kharej).”
97
  
An intriguing element of Shabestari’s discourse is that his critique largely collapses the 
difference between siyasa as punishment (a definition drawn from strictly legal terminology) 
and siyasa as politics.  So that his critique of a specific subset of Islamic jurisprudence, a 
subset related to issues of punishment, becomes equally a critique of the jurists’ authority to 
rule.   
Jurisprudence as a Worldly Science: The Decline of Islamic Jurisprudence 
 Shabestari’s critique of juridical authority, however is not limited to a critique of the 
logical bases of jurisprudence.  Rather, he draws on Muhammad Ghazali (d. 1111) to argue 
for the limited nature of juridical authority over truly spiritual matters.  Shabestari predicates 
this argument upon a long­standing critique that relates Islamic jurisprudence to merely 
worldly religious actions.  Shabestari questions the Islamic State’s assumption of legal 
reasoning and the role of Islamic (rather than secular) jurisprudence in enforcing morality.  
He argues that at the point when “Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) became separated from 
religious experience and spirituality, the clarifying of God’s orders and prohibitions turned 
into merely clarifying ‘forms of practices,’ and the connection was severed between obeying 
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god Muslim people’s religious purpose, ultimate concern, and unconditional demand; in the 
words of Ghazali, this science [fiqh] became merely worldly (donyavi).”
98
 
 This citation of Ghazali is essential here.  Ghazali himself represents a seminal 
critique of legalistic Islam, and he advocated instead a more mystical (irfan / Sufi) approach 
to religious practice.
99
  What Shabestari finds useful in Ghazali, however, is not his 
relationship to mystical forms of religiosity, but rather the hierarchy that Ghazali articulate 
between worldly and other­worldly sciences.  As Ken Garden has noted, in The Revival of 
Religious Sciences (‘Ihya Ulum al­Din) “al­Ghazali draws a distinction…between this world 
(al­dunyā) and the other world (al­ākhira)….Through the Iḥyā’…this distinction marks a 
division of the religious sciences into worldly and otherworldly.”
100
  Ghazali himself 
advocates “’ilm ṭarīq al­ākhira, the science of the path of the other world….[Salvation] is the 
main goal of religion and is pursued through the otherworldly science.”  All other sciences, 
including Islamic jurisprudence, therefore “deal with the affairs of this world, and thus, while 
not without religious significance, are nonetheless of secondary importance.”
101
   
 In fact, Ghazali positions much of the early portions of the Ihya’ as a critique of 
jurisprudence.  Like Shabestari, “Ghazali was disillusioned with the jurists (fuqaha’) for their 
inability to discern what he deemed to be the true meaning of things, namely the 
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transformation that the practices prescribed by the law should bring about in the legal and 
moral subject.”
102
  Ghazali, like Shabestari, notes that while past jurisprudence was linked to 
religious concerns, the jurisprudence of his contemporaries was hampered by worldly 
relations.  The element from Ghazali’s Revival that Shabestari draws into his critique is 
Ghazali’s valuation of internal states and sciences over the dictates of the jurisprudents.  
Ghazali’s text delineates clearly the limits of Islamic jurisprudence, suggesting that 
“concerning Islam the jurisprudent discourses on what renders it sound or unsound as well as 
on its conditions, but only pays attention to outward concerns.  The heart, however, is 
removed from his domain.”  In the case of prayer, for example, while the jurist may be able 
to oversee “whether or not it has been correctly performed in according with the prescribed 
regulations,” on the subject of “submitting and presenting the heart to God, however, both of 
which are works pertaining to the hereafter and through which works...are rendered 
efficacious, the jurisprudent does not address himself; and in the case he does, he oversteps 
his bounds.”
103
  This is a critique particularly relevant to Iranian dissidents working against 
the legally­defined Islamic Republic and is drawn on here in the works of Shabestari, and in 
those of Abdolkarim Soroush elsewhere. 
 While Shabestari does cite Ghazali’s statement that Islamic jurisprudence aligned 
with state power becomes merely “worldly,” he fails to note Ghazali’s own reading of the 
necessity of linking Islamic orders and prohibitions to state power.  As Ebrahim Moosa 
suggests, “the ethics of conduct is central to Muslim salvation practices….for Ghazali, there 
was a dialogical relationship between macro and micro politics, namely, between the 
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governance of the polis and the governance of the body.”
104
    Ghazali’s text imagines an 
interlocutor asking “’Why have you appended jurisprudence to secular [worldly] sciences 
and grouped jurisprudents among secular [worldly] scholars?’”
105
  Intriguingly, and not 
entirely within Shabestari’s aims in citing The Revival, Ghazali’s reply is not merely that the 
role of jurisprudence is limited, but also that jurisprudence is integral to the practice of 
Muslims in the world.  He suggest “It is the jurisprudent…who has the knowledge of the 
rules of government and the methods of mediation between the people whenever, because of 
their greed, they contend…I declare that jurisprudence is also connected with religion, not 
directly but [indirectly] through [the affairs of] this world, because this world is the 
preparation for the hereafter and there is no religion without it.”
106
   Yet even for Ghazali this 
intersection with worldly power is, as shown above, a decline for jurisprudence.    
 Regardless of Ghazali’s own intentions, Shabestari draws on the formative text of the 
Revival  to ground his critique of the authority of the Islamic Republic (as a state based in 
Islamic law) over religious morality.  In this critique of purely formal jurisprudence, 
Shabestari obliquely condemns the Islamic Republic, the instantiation of “commanding the 
good and forbidding evil” from which the state draws a good deal of its authority, and the 
state’s assumption that fiqh represents the highest form of religious experience.  Shabestari 
does suggest that a renewed examination of religious jurisprudence related to politics will 
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demonstrate that Islamic principles are not incompatible with democratic ones.
107
  Yet he, 
more significantly, argues as well that true religion cannot flourish under any sort of 
“trusteeship” responsible for the religious and moral activities of its citizens.
108
  What 
Shabestari suggests by citing Ghazali’s identification of fiqh as a “worldly science” is not 
that fiqh is secular (donyavi), but that linking religion and politics causes a detrimental 
transformation in the nature of religious practice, focusing it too much on the worldly 
performance of legal obligations and less on the true matters of the heart, which (as Ghazali 
suggested) are outside of the jurists’ domain.   
Tensions in Embodied Ethics and Democratic Citizenship  
 
 While Shabestari’s suggestion that Iranian Muslims understand “politics” as a purely 
worldly category cedes much to a secular realm of state practice, it retains as well an integral 
connection to a formative (rather than merely symbolic) religious ethics that denies easy 
divisions between secular and non­secular realms.  In terms of contemporary secular ethics, 
Talal Asad has suggested that “whereas ethics could at one time stand independently of a 
political organization…in a secular state it presupposes a specific political realm – 
representative democracy, citizenship, law and order, civil liberties, and so on.”
109
  What 
does Shabestari make of the political realm of democracy and citizenship that Asad cites?  
Shabestari tells us above that both matters of worship (‘ibadat) and matters of transactions or 
social ethics (mu’amalat) are still based in reason and no problem exists in their religious 
foundations.  Yet as much as politics as non­religious practice may define state authority as 
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outside religious logics, democratic practice remains indeterminably within the sphere of 
social (and therefore ethical) practice.   
 Asad, in describing discursive changes in Egyptian concepts of law during the 
colonial period, noted that Egyptian reformists often left out “ethics” from their 
reconstructions of Islamic jurisprudence.  For Asad, this blindness to ethics represents the 
modern secular state’s assumption of the sphere of ethics (now, democracy and citizenship) 
previously under the authority of religious logics.
110
  Asad suggests that the “distinction 
between law (which the state embodied, produced, and administered) and morality (which is 
the concern ideally of the responsible person generated and sustained by the family)” was 
central to this legal constitution.113  In this sense, the sidelining of Islamic jurisprudence 
outside the structures of the state (as relevant to morality rather than to law) represents a 
moment of secularization.  Yet while Asad’s discussion of secularization in Egypt focuses on 
legalistic understandings of Islam, in the Iranian milieu we must attend to the ways in which 
the state has constructed itself in Islamically jurisprudential terms.  In this context, we must 
attend to the ways in which secularist re-formations represent not solely the march of the 
secular, but also contestations over Islamically defined authority and practice.    
 Shabestari is interested less in constitutional constructions than in removing the 
state’s authority to enforce certain understandings of embodied worship.  As a response to 
the legal authority of the Islamic Republic, Shabestari’s construction reiterates the extent to 
which embodied worship (the focus of the Islamic Republic as it relates to correct action) is 
linked to individual conscience rather than legal authority and enforcement.  Salvation, 
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Shabestari suggests, stems from a close relationship with God outside the confines of the 
state. Defining religion as “finding one’s path toward the presence of God,” Shabestari 
argues this movement takes place only in individual communication with God and never 
under the authority or trusteeship of others.
115
 Yet this inner faith (iman) is not severed 
entirely from correct practice.  Shabestari suggests that Muslims during the time of 
Mohammad (correctly) understood god’s law (qanun) to mean submitting to the “orders of 
god” (hukm Allah) and becoming civilized (mota’addab shodan) through the discipline of 
devotion. The gnostics (‘urafa), in contrast to legal scholars, argued that these conscientious 
civilizing acts were central to religiosity.  Drawing again on one of the most well­known of 
these figures, Muhammad Ghazali, Shabestari argues that “when you open a book like 
[Ghazali’s] The Revival of the Religious Sciences, you see that from Ghazali’s perspective 
that which must be observed…are not the laws (qavanin) of life, but the adab of …life.”
116
    
 Indeed, Ghazali’s Revival draws heavily on this very concept of adab.
117
  Ghazali 
divided his Revival into four sections:  “Acts of Worship (al­`ibadat)”, “Norms of Daily Life 
(al­`adat)”, “The Ways to Perdition (al­muhlikat),” and “The Ways to Salvation (al­
munjiyat).”   The second section, the “Norms of Daily Life,” is itself divided into ten 
sections.  Eight of these sections focus on particular categories of adab, different modes of 
behavior, from ways of eating (kitab adab al­akl) to imitating the manners of the prophet 
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(kitab adab al­ma`isha wa ikhlaq al­nabwa).
118
  While in modern usage the term adab (in 
Iran, South Asia, as well as the Arab Middle East) has come to connote “literature,” the term 
as utilized by both Shabestari and Ghazali presents a more complex field of meaning.  
Ebrahim Moosa argues that we should translate adab neither as “civility” nor as “etiquette” 
(both translations are common). Rather, “it is that pedagogy that results in the cultivation of a 
virtue and motivates all human practices.  It is both the education itself and the practical 
formation of norms for right and exemplary conduct.”
119
  As Barbara Metcalf argues, “Adab 
in all its uses reflects a high valuation of the employment of the will in proper discrimination 
of correct order, behavior, taste....The term…is difficult for us to grasp because, although 
adab seems to refer to external behavior, it in fact encompasses inner qualities as well.”
120
  
Shabestari’s reconstruction of adab, this notion of civilizing practice as connected to 
religious worship and religious experience, in fact problematizes an easy notion of ‘the 
secular.’  Despite what some may assume about the privatized nature of religious experience, 
for Shabestari, the embodied civilizing practices of adab span all spheres of Muslim activity.  
He argues that early Muslim gnostics (`urafa’), despite their emphasis on individual 
relationships with the divine, did not locate these religious experience within some private 
sphere of family or personal life.  The gnostics asked, “What are the adab of commerce? 
What are the adab of traveling? What are the adab of socializing?...They use this term ‘adab’ 
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in worship, social ethics, and in politics.” 
121
  Unlike Asad’s reading of secularization in 
Egypt, Shabestari’s removal of politics from fiqh categories does not merely inscribe the 
state’s secular practice onto the Iranian sphere.  Instead, Shabestari draws on Ghazali’s 
reconstruction of adab as “the heart of law (fiqh),”
122
  to orient his critique against a 
particular reading of Islam that links formal worship to state governance and the authority of 
jurists.  In contesting that reading, Shabestari draws on registers of critique within the Islamic 
tradition that highlight the experience of the religious subject outside of legal commandments 
and prohibitions.  True shari`a, Shabestari argues, is not relatable to civil law as activities of 
state; rather, it marks the practices that “nourish religious experience.”
123
 As we saw above in 
terms of Ghazali’s critique of the legal establishment (in which jurisprudence, though only 
indirectly related to the religious path, was still central), Shabestari does not simply replicate 
Ghazali’s critique, but instead re­imagines it in order to suggest a rationalist secular politics.  
Unlike Shabestari, Ghazali pointed to the ways as well in which these activities did not 
require conscious knowledge of their utility on the part of the individual subject, but rather, 
as Metcalf suggests, Ghazali’s own theory of adab highlighted the ways in which “divinely 
revealed ritual actions…act on man in ways beyond his comprehension.”
124
 Yet, as a 
counter­discourse, the radical egalitarianism of adab presents a discourse open to re­
interpretation as democratic critique.  As Metcalf has argued, and this is particularly 
interesting when juxtaposed to the legal (fiqhi) claims of the Iranian jurists, “there is no 
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notion [in discourses surrounding adab] that moral exemplification…comes only from 
religious specialists set apart from the faithful.  In fact, Islam cherishes the notion that the 
most perfectly realized person of the age may be anyone….The theory of adab at least 
assumes all Muslims capable of spiritual discipline and realization.”
125
  Here, Shabestari’s 
critique comes into focus, as the theory of adab presupposes a path for contemporary Muslim 
subjects open to all individuals and centrally focused on the cultivation of moral virtue, a 
cultivation impossible to achieve through enforced observance. 
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Conclusions 
 How can we understand these Iranian dissident articulations beyond simply the 
imposition of a hegemonic secular insisting on an internal and individualistic (rather than 
material and juridically­defined) reading of religion?  The problem here, that I hoped to draw 
attention to through this thesis, is that Islamic traditions have involved not only literalist 
readings of the “material expressions” of religion, but contestations over the very ways in 
which scripture, law, and ritual should be read.  My argument here is that reading 
transformations in Islamic arguments (whether Asad’s reading of colonial and post­colonial 
Egyptian ethics or the secularist claims made by Iranian reformists), as merely a battleground 
between secular logic and Islamic ones, blinds us to the nuances of these post­colonial 
articulations.    
 Ultimately, in the Iranian contest, that which calls for response is not only the 
secular parameters of the nation­state, but a legally (fiqhi) constituted state.  It is in this sense 
that historically situated debates over the post­occultation authority of the jurists and the 
centrality of Islamic jurisprudence to religious life of a Muslim subject become meaningful.  
My contention is not that the existence of particular forms of imaginaries (the market, the 
secular) would have existed in Muslim­majority contexts without colonial and post­colonial 
impositions (indeed, such a counter­factual claim could be neither proven nor dis­proven 
historically), but rather that given the existence of such forms, our scholarship would be 
better served by attending to their valences than disputing their authenticity.    In the post­
revolution Iranian context we must pay at least equal attention to the ways in which the local 
47  
discourses, those of the juridical authority of fuqaha’ in this case, are contested through 
Islamic imaginaries.  In this way, while we might attend to the hegemonic power of the 
secular, we are careful as well not to define Muslim imaginaries only in opposition to 
secularist, or secularly­impacted, ones.  Instead, we recognize Muslim imaginaries not as 
closed, timeless orientations to text and practice, but as realms of contestation in which, and 
through which, theological and political debates are articulated and fought, but never fully 
resolved.   
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